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abstract: Within the ﬁeld of medically assisted reproduction, the welfare of the child is advanced as the major argument to decide the
acceptability of certain applications. This argument, however, needs a complex framework in order to be understood and used properly. The
effect of empirical evidence regarding the welfare of the child on people’s judgments about the acceptability of same-sex families will differ for
utilitarians and deontologists. Deontologists who are opposed to same-sex families will not change their mind when confronted with reas-
suring evidence. However, utilitarians also frequently use the evidence wrongly or draw the wrong conclusions. The reasonable welfare stan-
dard is put forward to avoid counterintuitive judgments and to block comparative reasoning that may follow from the use of heterosexual
families as a control in follow-up research. Finally, a number of problems related to the use of parental sexual orientation as a criterion are
discussed. The discrimination against same-sex families will not be overturned by empirical evidence about the welfare of the children. Chil-
dren in same-sex families are generally doing well but their situation could be improved if their parents’ relationship were to be socially and
legally recognized.
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Introduction
The requests by lesbian women to have access to donor sperm and
medically assisted reproduction has stirred strong emotions and
caused heated debates in most societies. Many people already ﬁnd
it hard to accept that two men or two women live together,
let alone that they also have children together. The whole discussion
on same-sex marriage, both in the USA and in Europe, illustrates this
conﬂict. The European parliament strongly advocates the extension of
marriage-like status for same-sex couples and takes steps to avoid dis-
crimination of citizens on the basis of sexual orientation. However,
some member states (especially the new member states) are reluctant
to adapt their legislation on this point and many want to protect the
institution of marriage in its traditional form. Moreover, even in the
‘old’ member states, the recognition of a registered partnership or
semi-marriage does not necessarily include the right to legal parent-
hood, adoption or medically assisted reproduction. Nevertheless, at
the state level, moves are being made to recognize same-sex
couples (Vermeulen, 2008).
The core of the discussion is the ethical acceptability of alternative
family forms. From the 1970s, several factors (increasing divorce rates,
sexual liberation, etc.) contributed to a breakdown of the quasi mon-
opoly of the stable heterosexual nuclear family. Until then, society as a
whole enforced this standard, both through legislation and mores;
deviations were not tolerated. Lesbian parents transgress several
boundaries simultaneously: ‘the ideological, because of its apparent
ﬂouting of the importance of fathers; the structural because of its
advocacy of either one-parent or two-mother households; and the
biogenetic, because of its avoidance of sexual intercourse’ (Haimes,
2000). In the mean time, homosexual households are here to stay.
In 2000 in the USA, there were 600 000 same-gender households.
American data shows that 35% of lesbian couples and 22% of gay
couples are raising children (Pawelski et al., 2006). It is also clear
that more and more homosexual, and especially lesbian couples
decide to fulﬁl their desire for a child within their relationship by
using medical techniques.
Within the ethical debate, the welfare of the child is a crucial argu-
ment. This article has three goals. First, it intends to explain why
opponents do not change their ethical position towards same-sex par-
enting when confronted with reassuring outcomes of psychological
studies regarding the welfare of the child. Secondly, it introduces the
‘reasonable welfare standard’ for the evaluation of applications of
medically assisted reproduction. This standard has the advantage
that it corresponds with the standard used when judging instances
of natural reproduction and cases of prenatal and preimplantation
genetic diagnosis. The standard also avoids the comparative reasoning
that may follow from using heterosexual families as a gold standard.
The third goal is to show that the current uses of the argument
lead to unacceptable or inconsistent conclusions.
Four points are made in this article: a distinction should be made
between necessary and recommendable conditions for parenting on
the basis of the effect on the welfare of the child; the focus on
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sexual orientation is highly selective because other parental conditions
(poverty etc.) carry more risk for the welfare of the children; the
burden of proof regarding harmful effects on the child is on those
who want to exclude certain groups of candidate parents; and
ﬁnally, conditions that affect children’s wellbeing may be taken not
only as selection or exclusion criteria but also as indications of how
the situation can be improved.
Theories to judge the
acceptability of new family forms
The normative ethical theories can be divided into two large schools:
deontological and utilitarian theories (Gaus, 2001). According to
deontological theories, an act (decision, etc.) is right when it is in
accordance with a moral rule or principle. When a person abides
by the rules and follows his duties and respects the rights of people,
he behaves morally. Deontologists may ground the rights and duties
in rationality but they may also ground them in laws of nature (an
act is wrong because it is unnatural) or on God’s saying (Samani
et al., 2007). Within deontological reasoning, consequences may
play a subordinate part but they are never decisive for the rightness
of the act or decision. Although most people probably associate deon-
tologists with the more conservative groups in the society, there is no
theoretical association. Proponents of parental rights for homosexual
couples may refer to the principle of respect for autonomy and the
right to reproduce (Robertson, 1994). Opponents may appeal to
the right of a child to have a father and a mother, the right to be
raised by one’s genetic parents, etc. As the examples above illustrate,
the biggest challenge for deontologists is to determine what the rights
and duties of the person are.
The second group of ethical theories can be brought together under
the header of consequentialism. Utilitarianism, which focuses on the
effects of the act on the well-being of all persons involved, is the
most popular consequentialist theory. For utilitarians, an act is good
(and right) when it maximizes well-being compared with all possible
alternative acts. The moral status of the act depends solely on the con-
sequences of the act. By focusing on consequences, the moral ques-
tion to a very large extent becomes empirically veriﬁable.
Psychological, sociological and other human science studies can give
us an answer as to whether or not a certain act, decision or situation
is harmful. For people who focus on rational argument and objectivity,
this feature of utilitarian theories is a very strong point.
The ‘welfare of the child’ is a typical consequentialist argument. It refers
to the possible impact of certain measures on the happiness and ﬂourish-
ing of a future person. As such, it includes both medical (handicaps,
disorders, etc.) and non-medical (psychological, social, economic, etc.)
elements (ESHRE Task force on Ethics and Law, 2007). Deontologists
may take the consequences for the welfare of the child into account
but the acceptability of an action is not determined by these conse-
quences but by the rules that are part of their worldview or religion.
Utilitarian arguments on the
welfare of the child
In discussions about the acceptability of techniques for medically
assisted reproduction, utilitarian arguments seem to dominate. This
also applies to the debate on homosexual parenthood. The main argu-
ment against same-sex parenting is that this setting goes against the
best interests of the future child. This argument is subdivided in
three more speciﬁc parts: (i) the risk for children to be homosexual
themselves, (ii) the stigmatization of children with homosexual
parents and (iii) the need for a mother and a father.
The ﬁrst type of harm is that children raised in homosexual families
are more likely to be or become homosexual themselves. This point
presupposes that being homosexual is a mental illness, a pathology
or, at least, a type of harm. Homosexuality is certainly a disadvantage
but this disadvantage is almost completely due to hostile reactions
from a homophobic society. The reasoning goes as follows: Premise
1: society treats homosexuals badly and they suffer, Premise 2: it is
against the best interests of child to be homosexual and, Conclusion:
we should not create a child in a setting where it has a high(er) risk
of becoming homosexual. It is ironic that especially in highly homopho-
bic countries, such as some Islamic countries where a homosexual
may be sentenced to death, discrimination is used to reinforce dis-
crimination. Samani et al. (2007) argue that bringing up a child in a
homosexual family in a homophobic society is completely against
the welfare of the child. The problem clearly lies with the ﬁrst
premise. Ethicists and human rights activists require people to show
that a certain characteristic causes harm independent from societal
reactions. If not, societal prejudice or public condemnation and rejec-
tion in itself would be a sufﬁcient reason to discriminate certain
groups.
The second argument is of a similar nature: children of homosexuals
will be ostracized, harassed and ridiculed by their peers for having
homosexual parents. Although this is conﬁrmed in some studies, the
magnitude of the stigmatization is not such that it results in hampered
emotional functioning or more behavioural problems (Anderssen
et al., 2002; Vanfraussen et al., 2002). Again, however, the cause of
the disadvantage is not the homosexuality of the parents itself but
the reactions from the social environment. Moreover, harassment
and embarrassment is a consequence of many other parental features
like obesity or unemployment.
The ﬁnal and most difﬁcult point is the statement that a child needs
a mother and a father. According to the opponents of same-sex par-
enting, children need dual-gender parents to learn appropriate gender-
role behaviour and to develop normally (Biblarz and Stacey, 2010).
However, the question is whether the absence of a father causes sig-
niﬁcant harm to the child. The conclusion of the debate in the UK,
where the ‘need of the child for a father’ was originally part of the
‘welfare of the child’ clause in the Code of Practice of the Human Fer-
tilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA), was that the presence of
a father is not essential. But what about the child’s ‘need for a
mother’? Most people seems to accept the need for a mother as self-
evident (as can be deduced from the fact that the question is not even
raised in discussions) but if it is, then the discussion on parenting by
gay couples is closed before it even started. Is there any reason to
assume that a child needs a mother more than it needs a father? Is
there an asymmetry between male and female same-sex couples?
While lesbians are struggling with the moral views and prejudices in
society, gay men undoubtedly have a manifold harder time convincing
people of the acceptability of their wish to parent. They challenge the
same traditional assumptions about gender, sexuality, reproduction
and family as lesbian women but in addition, they are confronted
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with stronger feelings of rejection and even hatred from certain groups
in the community. Moreover, fathers are viewed as secondary
caregivers and as essentially unﬁt to raise a child (Berkowitz and
Marsiglio, 2007).
Welfare of the child as a secular
argument
The use of the ‘welfare of the child’ argument needs to be understood
in the general context of the acceptability of certain arguments in the
ethical debates in liberal democracies. The general (mainly Rawlsian)
idea is that in political debates only impartial reasons and arguments
can be used, i.e. arguments that are shared and can be understood
by all, regardless of the person’s worldview. This idea is referred to
as ‘secular’. The term ‘secular’ is used ‘to identify what is open to
all, independent of a particular moral or religious tradition, but not
in explicit opposition to religion’ (Engelhardt, 1991). Secular morality
is contrasted with the ethics of particular communities that rely on
special traditions or revelations. In a liberal democracy, characterized
by a pluralism of moral opinions, all decisions should be justiﬁed by
generally accessible reasons. If one group enforces a rule that is
based on a worldview that is not shared by others, they violate the
freedom of others to live according to their worldview. People can
argue that homosexual marriage should be forbidden because it
goes against God’s rules on marriage but this argument cannot be
the basis of a societal policy because the argument refers to a particu-
lar worldview that is not shared by non-believers or believers of
another faith. If a society wants to prohibit homosexual partnerships
and expressions of love between same-sex persons, it has to look
for other arguments.
In the context of medically assisted reproduction, many objections
are based on religious beliefs since many religions have speciﬁc rules
on reproduction, sexuality and family building. These particular
views (both religious and secular) can be included in the political
debate by ‘translating’ the arguments into a secular form, meaning a
form that is understandable for every citizen, regardless of his or
her beliefs and values (Myskja, 2009). In fact, this might be exactly
why the ‘welfare of the child’ argument came to the forefront in the
debate: it is an argument that is accepted by all (or at least by most
groups in society) and thus provides a common ground for discussion
and decision-making.
However, this strategy of excluding arguments based on particular
worldviews or religions also has some disadvantages. First, it is particu-
larly difﬁcult to defend an argument when one is not allowed to refer
to the foundations of the argument. Secondly, not all arguments may
be translatable or they may lose most of their meaning. Thirdly, the
ethical debate may turn into a kind of shadow boxing: we hit the
other’s shadow (the welfare argument) while her or his body (the
deontological argument, the particular worldview) remains
unscratched. We should not be surprised than that the other is not
knocked out. The main difﬁculty caused by this position is the separ-
ation of the personal moral beliefs, convictions and values and the
arguments presented in the public domain. Many people ‘would not
be able to undertake such an artiﬁcial division within their own
minds’ (Habermas, 2006).
Let me try to make this more explicit. When a person states that he
or she is against homosexual parenting because the child is likely to
develop psychosocial problems, it is expected that they would
change their mind if this is demonstrated to be false. When people
stick to their opinion against strong evidence, we are inclined to
accuse them of bad faith. However, due to the gap created by the
translation, there is no reason why they would change their mind.
The original belief system is only slightly affected by the refutation
and other, stronger beliefs, that cannot be advanced as arguments
in the moral domain because they are inherently linked to the particu-
lar worldview, remain in place. The welfare of the children in different
family types is not the decisive argument; it is advanced by both
opponents and proponents to defend the position they already
adopted on deontological grounds. After being informed of the
empirical ﬁndings on homosexual families, the opponents may have
to look for other arguments than the welfare of the child for the
public discussion but they do not have to change their personal
opinion about homosexual parents.
This explains why some people (deontologists) are largely immune
to empirical evidence on the welfare of the child. However, utilitarians
who accept the empirical evidence also frequently use the information
wrongly or draw the wrong conclusions. This will be illustrated in the
sections that follow.
Evaluation standards
A major advantage of the welfare of the child as a criterion is that it
can be measured. As for numerous other psychological characteristics,
we can develop tests that measure well-being, or quality of life. Never-
theless, it is an extremely difﬁcult task in most circumstances. It
becomes even more difﬁcult when we try to predict the quality of
life of future or potential persons and this is precisely what is required
in the context of medically assisted reproduction. However, even if we
assume for a moment that we are able to estimate future well-being,
then we still need a standard to decide whether the level is acceptable
and sufﬁcient. Analysis of the literature on the acceptability of medical
interventions in reproduction reveals that two evaluation rules are
used to assess the quality of life: the minimum threshold and the
maximum welfare (Pennings, 1999).
The minimal threshold in its strictest form has also been indicated as
the ‘worse than death’ standard: reproduction, and a fortiori medically
assisted reproduction, is morally wrong when the future child will have
a quality of life so low that it would have been better not to have been
born (Robertson, 2004). This threshold implies that even when the
child will suffer from a severe disease and will have a short life span,
it is acceptable to bring it into the world. This standard expresses a
minimalist view on parental and medical responsibility for the
welfare of the future child (de Wert, 2003). Very few social conditions
(with the exception of extreme poverty resulting in the absence of the
most basic goods) will create circumstances that are so bad that
people should refrain from reproduction. It is clear that being born
in a lesbian or homosexual household will certainly not infringe on
this standard.
The maximum welfare standard goes to the other extreme: repro-
duction is only acceptable when the child is born in optimal circum-
stances. People using this standard demand ideal circumstances. No
medical assistance should be provided when there are indications
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that the conditions in which the child will be raised are not optimal.
These indications are usually found either in the characteristics of
the parents or in the social, economical and psychological circum-
stances in which the child will be brought up. People who adopt
this standard frequently associate the ideal circumstances with the tra-
ditional nuclear family. Reproduction in a setting that does not
conform to the heterosexual married parents with their genetic chil-
dren is assumed to have negative consequences for the children
(Golombok, 1998).
Both standards lead to highly counterintuitive judgments as they
force us on the one hand to condemn procreative decisions that
look fully acceptable and oblige us on the other hand to accept
decisions that seem completely unacceptable. Although there are
morally relevant differences between natural reproduction and medi-
cally assisted reproduction, these differences do not regard the stan-
dard of evaluation. Most people seem to believe that when people
are able to reproduce naturally, they are allowed to take higher
risks than when doctors are involved. However, this is not correct.
Imagine a couple with a high risk of transmitting a serious genetic
disease to their child. If this couple is infertile, they would (probably)
not be accepted for assisted reproduction without agreeing to
measures (such as preimplantation genetic diagnosis) that bring
down the risk to an acceptable level (Pennings et al., 2003). The differ-
ence between a fertile couple and an infertile couple is the practical
ability of the doctor to prevent the birth of a child with this risk by
refusing to collaborate. The moral evaluation of the parents’ decision,
however, should be the same whether they are fertile or not. Even if
society does not intervene to stop the fertile couple from taking this
risk, society should condemn them for doing so and judge their
decision as morally wrong. In other words, the same standard
should be used to evaluate applications of medically assisted reproduc-
tion and instances of natural reproduction. As we argued above, both
the maximum welfare and the minimal threshold standard fail on this
count. The solution is an intermediate standard which I called the
‘reasonable welfare standard’ (Pennings, 1999). This may sound
rather vague but it is no more vague than the other standards. All stan-
dards have a grey zone of borderline cases. Moreover, we are already
familiar with this standard since we use it to decide about cases of pre-
natal and preimplantation genetic diagnosis (de Wert, 2003). The
general idea is that reproduction is acceptable when there is no high
risk of serious harm, or put in a more positive way, when there is a
reasonable chance that the future person will have the abilities and
possibilities to realize those dimensions and goals that make human
lives valuable.
Comparative analysis
Most studies on children in lesbian families have used heterosexual
families as control groups. The whole point of control groups is to
determine the inﬂuence of the variable that one wants to measure.
The control group for homosexual families is heterosexual families.
There are very few studies in which characteristics and processes of
a heterosexual family are studied with homosexual families as
control. The problem is that, because of the homophobic atmosphere
and heterosexist rule, the control group (i.e. heterosexual family) is
perceived as the gold standard. As a consequence, when a group
does not reach the same level as the control group, it is automatically
classiﬁed as substandard or inferior. The comparative analysis goes as
follows: family type A results in children with a mean quality of life of
X. Family type B leads to children with a lower mean quality of life.
Conclusion: people living in type B should not have children, and a
fortiori, should not have access to medically assisted reproduction.
This reasoning is based on several underlying premises that are hard
to defend. First, it assumes the rightness of the maximum welfare stan-
dard and we have shown above that this standard cannot be main-
tained because it obliges us to condemn most (if not all)
reproductive decisions made by fertile people. Secondly, a lower
quality of life of the children does not automatically mean an unaccep-
table quality of life. It would be more appropriate to apply a threshold
system: children should not be created in family types that present a
high risk of serious harm for the child. Thirdly, the signiﬁcant differ-
ences in self-esteem and psychological well-being that were actually
found between children in lesbian families and heterosexual families
were in favour of lesbian parents (Stacey and Biblarz, 2001). If the
same line of reasoning is used as above, the conclusion from this
ﬁnding would be that heterosexual couples should not have access
to assisted reproductive technology (ART). I have never met anyone
willing to accept this conclusion. But if one rejects it, one needs to
explain why that conclusion can be drawn when children in lesbian
or gay families would be doing worse. Finally, even if the alternative
family settings would hold fewer risks than heterosexual families,
that does not render these risks acceptable. Suppose that we ﬁnd
that 10% of the children in heterosexual families are abused. Would
it then be OK if only 8% of homosexual couples maltreated their chil-
dren? We need to measure factors such as the psychosocial develop-
ment or cognitive development without reference to heterosexual
families. Our concern should not be whether one type of family or
one kind of parent is better than the others. We should determine
which parents and families have a high risk of serious negative out-
comes for their children and what we can do about this.
Necessary or recommendable
condition
The use of the reasonable welfare standard has implications for the
status attributed to a parental characteristic or situational condition.
Two questions should be answered: (i) is the characteristic, condition,
etc. necessary? and (ii) is the characteristic, condition, etc. recom-
mendable? A characteristic is necessary if the absence thereof would
hold a high risk that the child will not have a reasonably happy life.
A characteristic is recommendable if its presence in general has a posi-
tive effect on the child’s well-being. This means that it increases the
well-being of the person above the reasonable welfare threshold.
The evidence from several types of fatherless families (widows,
divorced couples, single women) strongly suggests that the presence
of a man is not necessary for the children to have a reasonably
happy life but it also indicates that the presence of a second parent
increases the options and chances of the children. An unnecessary
characteristic cannot be used to exclude patients from infertility treat-
ment but it may be a matter of concern for which compensating
measures could or should be proposed. We might very well decide
that the presence of an opposite-gender parent is recommendable
and that same-sex couples should look for ways to integrate a
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person of the opposite sex in the upbringing of their child. Evidently,
before such recommendations are issued, it needs to be shown that
the child cannot ﬁnd role models in men from the broader social
environment like grandfathers, teachers, etc.
Precautionary principle and the
burden of proof
The opponents advance a kind of precautionary principle when dis-
cussing alternative families. The principle goes approximately as
follows: before we move from the standard situation (heterosexual
couples) to alternative families, we have to be sure that the welfare
of the child in the new families is not threatened. One should not
create children in family structures as long as it has not been conclus-
ively shown that these families are equivalent to heterosexual families.
The use of this principle is remarkable for three reasons: ﬁrst, it shifts
the burden of proof to the persons in the alternative family structures.
They have to demonstrate their suitability as parents before they get
access. This request may turn out to be a ‘catch-22’: alternative
families have to demonstrate that their family type is consistent with
the best interests of the child before they can start treatment.
However, the only way they could show this is by having children
and they are not allowed to have them without proof. Secondly,
asking people in alternative family types to demonstrate their suitability
goes against the spirit of international law. The human rights declara-
tion states that people should not be discriminated against on the basis
of certain characteristics, including sexual orientation. People who
wish to deviate from the principle of equality should bear the
burden of proof. They should establish that non-heterosexual
persons act against the best interests of the child and not the other
way around (Tobin and McNair, 2009). It is noteworthy that society
does not tolerate discriminatory behaviour when it concerns race or
sex but that discrimination on sexual orientation, and especially
when the discrimination is based on religious beliefs, is reluctantly
accepted.
Factors inﬂuencing the child’s
well-being
Why focus on sexual orientation? The explanation most likely must be
sought in the deviation from the ‘normal’ situation of the heterosexual
nuclear family and the general negative attitude towards homosexual
persons. Nevertheless, we keep repeating these studies even when,
up till now, there are no indications that this characteristic has any
inﬂuence on parental capacity. At the same time, other features
have a demonstrable effect on the child’s welfare. A strong desire
for parenthood and warm and supportive relationships are frequently
put forward as true determining factors for the child’s well-being
(Tobin and McNair, 2009). Why not screen couples on these
factors? The main problem would obviously be that they are difﬁcult
to operationalize and measure. Still, two other quantiﬁable and mea-
surable factors are worth scrutiny: parental income and abuse of the
parent as a child.
The best studied factor is parental income. Children raised in poor
families do considerably worse than children in well-off families. Low
parental resources have been found to have a detrimental effect on
the children’s educational achievements, socio-emotional develop-
ment and are linked to an increase in behavioural problems
(McLoyd, 1998). The studies show that ﬁnancial problems during
childhood may have long-term implications on physical and mental
health which extend into adulthood (Weitoft et al., 2008). What
follows from this? If it is the duty of society to guarantee that children
are born in optimal circumstances, we should select infertility patients
on the basis of ﬁnancial resources. We could for instance stipulate that
couples with a yearly income below a certain threshold are not eligible
for assisted reproduction. One reason for not imposing this measure is
that it is highly politically incorrect to even suggest that poor people
should not have children or should be denied access to ART. But
what exactly is wrong with this reasoning? One could argue that the
distinction in access between poor and rich is not discriminatory
because it is based on a relevant difference, namely the differential
effect on the welfare of the future child. When we return to homosex-
ual couples, the conclusion would be that excluding homosexual
couples is discrimination, i.e. unjustiﬁed distinction between persons,
because no effect on parental capacity and no higher risk for negative
outcomes for children have been shown. We should, if we take this
reasoning seriously, exclude persons who possess characteristics
that have objectively been shown to have a detrimental effect on
the child’s welfare.
Another example of such characteristic is being the victim of child
abuse. It has been demonstrated that people who have been
abused as a child have a much higher risk themselves of abusing
their own children (Mo¨hler et al., 2009). Up to 50% of the parents
with experience of childhood maltreatment abuse their children
(Leifer et al., 2004). Given the fact that between 15 and 25% of
young women report a history of sexual abuse, this should be con-
sidered a common and serious risk for future children. As a conse-
quence, screening of infertility patients and/or future parents for
this characteristic seems worthwhile in view of the protection of the
offspring. In fact, it could be argued that this is an ‘aspect of the
patient’s past or current circumstances which is likely to lead to an
inability to care for the child to be born throughout its childhood’
[clause G.3.3.2 (a) of the Code of Practice; Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Authority, 2008]. As far as I know, no centre in the
world automatically denies access to victims of childhood abuse.
However, many countries and fertility centres maintain a blanket
rejection of homosexual couples. Even if we assume, against the avail-
able evidence, that children raised in homosexual families suffer some
disadvantages, one cannot reasonably argue that the risks, both in
terms of probability and seriousness, are as high as the risks associated
with poverty and parental childhood abuse.
Supportive measures
The argument mentioned above regarding poverty and childhood
abuse demonstrates another point regarding the empirical evidence
about the welfare of the child. The studies show the effects of
family type, sexual orientation, mental capacities, age, etc. on the chil-
dren who grow up in such families. Even if we work with a strict
threshold, no direct conclusion can be drawn from these data for
the moral acceptability of reproduction. It can be argued that the
empirical data point at the dangers and thus enable us (to try) to
do something about them. Take poverty as an example. Society in
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most countries takes a multitude of measures to attenuate the nega-
tive effects of poverty. These measures can be directed at the family
budget (tax cuts, child support, free schooling . . . ) or directly at the
child (close supervision by social workers, extra support, etc.). Most
afﬂuent societies have all kinds of specialized personnel (like teachers,
psychologists, social workers, etc.) to help parents raise their children.
Instead of concluding from the shortcomings of certain settings that
these people should refrain from building a family, society can use this
knowledge in order to introduce measures to compensate for the
shortcomings. One such measure for homosexual parents could be
their right to marry. Homosexual parents and their children face difﬁ-
cult challenges as a result of the exclusion from civil marriage. By
recognizing parental rights and obligations of the non-biological
parent in same-sex couples, the situation of the children may
improve in terms of ﬁnancial, social and psychological stability. Mar-
riage promotes legal and ﬁnancial stability, stable psychosocial relation-
ships and a sense of acceptance (Pawelski et al., 2006). Institutional,
cultural and moral rules all work against homosexual parents. This
context adds enormous stress to the already high normal stress of par-
enting (Armesto, 2002). Society ﬁrst makes rearing children very difﬁ-
cult for homosexual parents and then condemns them for not being
able to perform as well as the heterosexuals. Same-sex parents
have the same obligations as heterosexual couples but they do not
receive the same instruments (i.e. rights and support) to fulﬁl these
obligations. In fact, the inﬂuence of their sexual orientation on their
parental capacity can only be measured when they dispose of the
same means to do the job.
Conclusion
All parties declare that the welfare of the children created and raised in
different family structures is of paramount importance. This criterion
is, however, notoriously difﬁcult to measure. Moreover, even if
welfare could be measured objectively, one still needs to evaluate
the result. The ‘reasonable welfare standard’ is defended as the
most appropriate threshold to decide whether creating and raising
children in certain family types are morally acceptable. This implies a
rejection of the comparative analysis which takes heterosexual families
as the gold standard. However, doubts can be raised about the real
importance of the welfare of the child within the belief structure of
many people. Most people do not change their minds about the
acceptability of family building by same-sex parents when empirical
evidence points in a direction that contradicts their beliefs. The
basic position against homosexual parenting is not determined by
the expected outcome on the welfare of the children but by moral
repugnance and a belief in the inherent wrongness of homosexuality.
It is very important that these moral emotions are not accepted as
arguments in public policy decisions or in legislative initiatives.
Finally, a good policy tries to combine as many morally relevant
rules as possible. In the context of same-sex parenting, both the
right of homosexual persons to build a family and the child’s right to
a good life can be respected by providing conditions of full equality
and respect. The well-being of the children would improve consider-
ably were same-sex relationships legally recognized and socially
respected, and were same-sex parents treated as adequate parents.
And the welfare of the child was our primary goal, was it not?
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